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ABSTRACT 
What burden of proof should govern wage and hour exemptions under 
Alaska law?  Under federal law, the majority rule is that wage and 
hour exemptions are established by a preponderance of the evidence.  
However, in Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey the Alaska Supreme 
Court adopted a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the most 
stringent burden that could be imposed.  This Article explains why 
the Fred Meyer standard conflicts with precedent, reason, and policy 
and proposes an analytical model for either the Alaska Supreme Court 
or the Alaska Legislature to use in abandoning Fred Meyer and 
adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the classic formulation well-known to Alaska lawyers, Alaska 
courts will “adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of 
precedent, reason, and policy.”1 However, is this necessarily correct? In 
the 1993 opinion Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc.,2 the Alaska Supreme 
Court quoted, in dicta, a federal lower court opinion for the proposition 
that wage and hour exemptions should be denied if there was a 
reasonable doubt as to their applicability.3 Eleven years later in Fred 
Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey,4 the Alaska Supreme Court applied this 
dicta to hold that a “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” governed 
 
 *  J.D., University of Washington School of Law (1991).  B.A., State 
University of New York, Binghamton (1988).  The author is a partner with Davis 
Wright Tremaine LLP in its Anchorage office.  The views expressed in this 
Article are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of Davis 
Wright Tremaine or its clients. This article is dedicated to the late Judge James 
M. Fitzgerald, a great judge and Alaskan.  
 1. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979); see also United States v. 
CNA Fin. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097 (D. Alaska 2005). 
 2. 848 P.2d 1367 (Alaska 1993). 
 3. Id. at 1372. 
 4. 100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004). 
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analysis of wage and hour exemptions.5 This is the most stringent 
standard that could be imposed. The court adopted this standard 
without explanation or analysis.6 Instead, it simply cited Dayhoff, which 
itself cited a Court of Claims opinion7 analyzing a threshold 
jurisdictional issue and quoting a policy from the Civil Service 
Commission (an agency that does not even exist anymore, having been 
replaced by the Office of Personnel Management). In short, traced back 
to its origins, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is based on an 
attempt by an official for a now defunct federal agency to articulate the 
concept that exemptions are narrowly construed. Moreover, in adopting 
this elevated burden of proof, the court ignored the settled principle that 
the default burden of proof in civil actions should be the preponderance 
of the evidence standard. Subsequent statutory amendments to the 
Alaska Wage and Hour Act cast further doubt on Fred Meyer’s result. 
This Article briefly reviews wage and hour principles, explains 
why the Fred Meyer standard conflicts with precedent, reason, and 
policy, and proposes an analytical model for either the Alaska Supreme 
Court or the Alaska Legislature to use in abandoning Fred Meyer and 
adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard. Part I briefly 
reviews background principles and developments in the law necessary 
for an understanding of the Fred Meyer standard. Part II analyzes the 
Fred Meyer standard and concludes that it is an unsound rule that should 
be abandoned. Part III discusses judicial and legislative options that 
could be applied for purposes of addressing and correcting Fred Meyer.8 
I. THE ROAD TO FRED MEYER 
A. A Brief Review of State and Federal Wage and Hour Law 
This Article is not intended as a comprehensive review of wage and 
hour principles. However, a brief review of significant concepts is 
necessary in order to evaluate the Fred Meyer standard in context. Wage 
and hour law establishes rules governing compensation for employees. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the federal scheme enacted 
during the Great Depression both as a means of improving working 
 
 5. Id. at 884. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Dayhoff, 848 P.2d at 1372. 
 8. The author principally represents employers and businesses and has 
directly or indirectly litigated the burden of proof issue in two prior cases: 
Motion for Rule of Law, Borge v. Getronics USA, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-105(TMB) (D. 
Alaska dismissed May 14, 2009) and Motion for Rule of Law, Black v. Colaska, 
Inc., No. C07-0823 JLR (W.D. Wash. appeal dismissed Mar. 26, 2009). 
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standards and as an incentive to encourage employers to hire more 
workers.9 Its chief components are establishment of a minimum wage 
and a premium, or overtime, rate that is calculated based on the 
minimum wage.10 Overtime is the pay rate that employers must pay 
when employees work over a specified number of hours.11 The overtime 
rate is one and one half the regular rate of pay.12 For example, if an 
employee’s regular rate of pay was twelve dollars per hour of work, his 
or her overtime rate would be eighteen dollars per hour of work ($12 x 
1.5 = $18). If an employee is entitled to overtime, the overtime rate is 
paid for all work over forty hours in a given workweek.13 The Alaska 
Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) is patterned after the FLSA and 
incorporates many of the same terms with a few significant variations 
discussed further below. 
         Indeed, the FLSA and the AWHA were both enacted for the same 
general purpose: “to establish minimum wage, maximum workweek, 
and overtime compensation standards which are adequate to maintain 
the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers.”14 In a sense, 
the AWHA supplements the FLSA in that it covers entities not engaged 
in interstate commerce; otherwise such entities would avoid the 
requirements of the FLSA.15 That is, the AWHA functions as a backstop 
to ensure that employers engaged solely in intrastate commerce are 
nevertheless covered by wage and hour requirements. 
Courts frequently describe wage and hour law as being remedial 
legislation enacted for the benefit of workers.16 This accurately reflects 
public policy findings declared by both the FLSA and the AWHA.17 
However, an often overlooked or underappreciated concept underlying 
the FLSA was to spur job growth.18 The nation was mired in the Great 
 
 9. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219) (2006).  The FLSA’s policy goals 
are set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
 10. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006) (minimum wage); 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (overtime). 
 11. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2). 
 12. Id. § 207(a). 
 13. Id. § 207(a)(2)(C). 
 14. Webster v. Bechtel, 621 P.2d 890, 896 (Alaska 1980). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See, e.g., Whitesides v. U-Haul Co. of Alaska, 16 P.3d 729, 732 (Alaska 
2001). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (FLSA); ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.050 (2010) (AWHA). 
 18. See JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN 66–67 (1991); see also Yi v. 
Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The purposes [of 
the FLSA] are to spread work in order to reduce unemployment, to discourage 
(by increasing the cost to the employer) a degree of overtime that might impair 
workers’ health or safety, and to increase the welfare of low-paid workers.”); cf. 
Janes v. Otis Eng’g Corp., 757 P.2d 50, 53 (Alaska 1988) (understanding Alaska’s 
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Depression, and the FLSA was a product of social engineering. Its key 
components (a forty-hour workweek, the establishment of a minimum 
wage, and overtime) were designed, in part, to encourage employers to 
hire more employees.19 For example, the concept was that if an employer 
had one employee who usually worked sixty hours in a week, the 
employer would have an incentive to hire another worker because it 
would be more cost effective for the employer to hire a part-time 
employee to work the extra twenty hours rather than pay the full-time 
employee an overtime rate. 
1. Key elements of wage and hour law 
Under the FLSA, the key time period is forty hours in a given 
workweek.20 A workweek is any period of seven consecutive twenty-
four hour days.21 The employer defines the workweek but may not do so 
in a manner designed to evade overtime requirements.22 An employee 
eligible for overtime is paid overtime for all work over forty hours in 
that workweek.23 In the prior example, if the employee worked forty-
seven hours in one workweek, his or her wages for that week would be 
$606 ($12/hour X 40 = $480 + $18/hour X 7 = $126). The AWHA 
incorporates the same forty-hour workweek standard but also includes a 
daily time period of eight hours a day.24 
The concept of being employed is broadly defined under both the 
FLSA and the AWHA. To employ means “to suffer or permit to work.”25 
All employees are eligible for the minimum wage and overtime unless 
they are exempt. Accordingly, a critical concept in wage and hour law 
concerns the classification of employees as exempt or non-exempt.26 
Exemptions are established by law. The exemptions often overlap; that 
is, an employee classified as exempt under one exemption may also be 
classified as exempt under another exemption as well. 
 
version of the fair labor act similarly). 
 19. Cf. SCHOR, supra note 18, at 66–67. 
 20. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2006). 
 21. 29 C.F.R. § 778.105 (2010). 
 22. Id. 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a);  29 C.F.R. §§ 778.100–778.101 (2010). 
 24. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(a) (2010). 
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006).  Alaska law incorporates federal definitions 
except where Alaska expressly defines a concept differently.  ALASKA STAT. § 
23.10.145 (2010). 
 26. Another important concept involves the classification of workers as 
employees or independent contractors, the latter not being subject to wage and 
hour principles.  See Jeffcoat v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Alaska 
1987).  This sub-issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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The AWHA includes seventeen exemptions that apply to both state 
minimum wage and overtime requirements,27 nineteen exemptions that 
apply to state overtime requirements,28 and three exemptions that apply 
to minimum wage.29 The FLSA includes eleven exemptions that apply to 
federal minimum wage and overtime requirements30 and twenty-one 
that apply to federal overtime.31 
Some of these exemptions are “industry” exemptions that exclude 
coverage for employees in an entire industry. For example, under the 
AWHA, agricultural workers are exempt from the Act.32 Others are 
“business-related” exemptions that exclude coverage for businesses of a 
certain size. For example, under the AWHA, employers that employ less 
than four employees in the regular course of business are exempt from 
the Act’s overtime requirements,33 as are lumber operations employing 
fewer than twelve employees.34 “Worker-related” exemptions exclude 
certain specific workers from coverage, such as executives, 
administrative employees, professionals, outside sales personnel, and 
computer analysts (if they satisfy prescribed regulatory standards).35 
These are merely illustrative examples. 
Of these three general exemption categories, the industry and 
business-related exemptions usually pose little or no difficulty in 
interpreting and applying the relevant standards because the 
exemptions are generally straightforward. Employers will usually know 
whether or not they fit the defined concepts. However, the worker-
related exemptions often pose more significant challenges because they 
depend upon analysis of each worker’s actual job duties in connection 
with the relevant legal standards governing the exemption in question. 
2. Interpreting and applying “white collar” exemptions 
The worker-related exemptions that pose the most significant 
analytical and practical problems are the so-called Section 13(a)(1), or 
“white collar,” exemptions.36 Three of the more difficult “white collar” 
exemptions are the exemptions for executive, administrative, and 
 
 27. ALASKA STAT.  § 23.10.055(a) (2010). 
 28. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(d). 
 29. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.070. 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)–(17) (2006).  Six of these subdivisions have been 
repealed. See, e.g., id. § 213(a)(2) (repealed 1989). 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b).  Note that nine of the subsections of this statute have 
been repealed. See, e.g., id. § 213(b)(4) (repealed 1974). 
 32. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(a)(1), (10). 
 33. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(d). 
 34. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(d)(9). 
 35. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(a)(9). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
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professional employees. These exemptions depend upon application of 
the salary basis test. In order to qualify for an exemption: (1) the 
employee must be paid a salary;37 (2) the salary amount must meet 
minimum threshold levels; and (3) the employee may perform only 
certain duties that are described in the regulation.38 The federal salary 
threshold for most of the white collar exemptions is $455 per week.39  
The Alaska standard is $620 per week.40 
The “white collar” exemptions are defined by dense regulatory 
language that frequently embraces deceptively misleading concepts.  For 
example, in order to qualify for an administrative employee exemption, 
an employee’s “primary duty” must be performing office or non-manual 
work that is “directly related to the management or general business 
operations” of the employer, and the employee’s primary duty must 
include exercising “discretion and independent judgment with respect 
to matters of significance.”41 An executive employee must have the 
“primary duty” of “management” of the enterprise, must “customarily 
and regularly” direct the work of two or more employees, and must 
have authority to make significant decisions or recommendations that 
are accorded weight.42 
All of these concepts are terms of art, and there is an “Alice in 
Wonderland”-like quality to wage and hour regulations. By way of 
illustration, “primary duty” means the main or important duty, but the 
term is not defined by relation to the amount of time spent on exempt 
work.43 Instead, “the character of the employee’s job as a whole” is the 
relevant benchmark for evaluating a primary duty.44 Time spent 
performing exempt work may be relevant, but an employee need not 
spend most of his or her time performing exempt work in order to be 
classified as exempt.45 Consequently, an employee’s primary duty can 
be, in theory, a duty that is performed less than a majority of the total 
time spent working.46 
 
 37. Payment on a salary basis requires that the employee be paid a fixed, 
recurring amount each workweek without consideration for the hours worked 
and without reduction for the quality or quantity of work. 29 C.F.R. § 541.602 
(2010). 
 38. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.600–541.601. 
 39. 29 C.F.R. § 541.600(a). 
 40. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(b).  This amounts to twice the minimum wage, 
$7.75 per hour, for 40 hours worked in a week.  Id. 
 41. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). 
 42. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a). 
 43. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a)–(b). 
 44. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). 
 45. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b). 
 46. Id. 
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“Customarily and regularly” is defined as “a frequency that must 
be greater than occasional but which, of course, may be less than 
constant.”47 This leaves employers and their counsel on an uncertain 
regulatory continuum. “Directly and closely related” tasks are defined 
as “tasks that are related to exempt duties and that contribute to or 
facilitate performance of exempt work.”48 However, such work “may 
include physical tasks and menial tasks that arise out of exempt duties, 
and the routine work without which the exempt employee’s exempt 
work cannot be performed properly.”49 
Exercising “discretion and independent judgment . . . involves the 
comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct[] and 
acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been 
considered.”50 The relevant factors emphasize an employee’s authority 
to independently function in a variety of managerial-related tasks.51 
“However, employees can exercise discretion and independent 
judgment even if their decisions or recommendations are reviewed at a 
higher level.”52 Indeed, the regulations emphasize the fact that an 
employee’s decisions or recommendations “are revised or reversed after 
review does not mean that the employee is not exercising discretion and 
independent judgment.”53 
Even a concept as seemingly straightforward as “management” can 
present interpretative obstacles. The definition includes classic 
managerial duties such as: 
[I]nterviewing, selecting, and training of employees; 
setting and adjusting their rates of pay and hours of 
work; directing the work of employees; maintaining 
production or sales records for use in supervision or 
control; [and] appraising work performance; handling 
employee complaints and grievances; disciplining 
employees; planning the work; determining the 
 
 47. 29 C.F.R. § 541.701. 
 48. 29 C.F.R. § 541.703(a). 
 49. Id. 
 50. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a). 
 51. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b).  These include, among others, the “authority to 
formulate . . . policies; . . . authority to commit the employer in matters that have 
significant financial impact; . . . authority to waive or deviate from established 
policies and procedures without prior approval; . . . authority to negotiate and 
bind the company on significant matters; . . . [and] represent[ing] the company 
in handling [disciplinary matters and proceedings].” Id. 
 52. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c). 
 53. Id. 
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techniques to be used; [and] apportioning the work 
among the employees.54 
However, “management” also includes duties that a filing clerk or 
receptionist could perform, such as: 
[D]etermining the type of materials, supplies, 
machinery, equipment or tools to be used or 
merchandise to be bought, stocked and sold; controlling 
the flow and distribution of materials or merchandise 
and supplies; providing for the safety and security of 
the employees or the property; planning and controlling 
the budget; and monitoring or implementing legal 
compliance measures.55 
These are merely representative examples to illustrate some of the 
definitions that employers and their counsel must wrestle with when 
evaluating whether employees should be classified as exempt or non-
exempt. As can be seen from these examples, there is considerable 
“play” with respect to the regulatory concepts that govern wage and 
hour law. Oftentimes, interpretation is subject to conflicting case law or 
agency decisions and opinions that are not always consistent with one 
another.56 The point in briefly highlighting these regulatory definitions 
is to place the burden of proof issue into an understandable context. 
Wage and hour law is not as simple as merely marshalling the 
proverbial “mountain of evidence.” Instead, it is fair to comment that it 
is not always immediately clear what specific evidence is necessary or 
useful with respect to specific exemptions. 
 
 54. 29 C.F.R. § 541.102 (2010). 
 55. Id. 
 56. For example, for several years the United States Department of Labor 
classified mortgage loan officers as exempt administrative employees.  
However, on March 24, 2010, Deputy Administrator Leppink issued new 
guidance concluding that mortgage loan officers were non-exempt. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1 (2010). Another 
example is seen in how employees working as computer professionals are 
classified.  Courts have issued a wide range of conflicting opinions that are not 
always easily reconcilable. Compare Koppinger v. Am. Interiors, Inc., 295 F. 
Supp. 2d 797, 802 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (computer professional exempt because the 
troubleshooting being performed involved investigating problems, considering 
possible solutions, and implementing the solution deemed best for the situation, 
all indicia of discretion and independent judgment), with Turner v. Human 
Genome Sci., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742, 747 (D. Md. 2003) (computer 
professionals non-exempt because the troubleshooting that they performed did 
not involve exercise of discretion and independent judgment). 
FISHER_FINAL 5/5/2011  3:20:29 PM 
2011 WAGE & HOUR EXEMPTION STANDARD 105 
B. Standards and Burden of Proof for Analyzing Exemptions 
Certain principles govern analysis of wage and hour exemptions. 
Under the FLSA, exemptions are affirmative defenses for which the 
employer carries the burden of proof.57 The United States Supreme 
Court has held that they are to be narrowly construed58 and must be 
plainly and unmistakably established.59 Some circuit courts have added 
an additional interpretative guideline by instructing that exemptions 
must be proved by “clear and affirmative” evidence.60 
Alaska courts apply comparable principles for analyzing 
exemptions under the AWHA.61 Exemptions are “narrowly construed 
and limited to those ‘plainly and unmistakably within their terms and 
spirit.’”62 
Although these principles alert an employer to the importance of 
meeting its burden, the overwhelming majority rule is that the actual 
burden of proof for establishing an exemption remains the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Four United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeal studying this issue (the Sixth,63 Seventh,64 Ninth, 65 and 
Eleventh66 Circuits) have held that the burden remains a preponderance 
of the evidence standard. Additionally, federal district courts in six 
circuits (the First,67 Second,68 Third,69 Fifth,70 Eighth,71 and Eleventh72) 
 
 57. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1974). 
 58. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960). 
 59. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). 
 60. Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 725 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 61. See Whitesides v. U-Haul Co. of Alaska, 16 P.3d 729, 732 (Alaska 2001). 
 62. Id. (quoting Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392). 
 63. Thomas v. Speedway Superamerica LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501–02 (6th Cir. 
2007); Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 64. Yi v. Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 506–09 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 65. Dickenson v. United States, 353 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1966); Coast Van 
Lines v. Armstrong, 167 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1948). 
 66. Dybach v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1566 n.5 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 67.  Reeves v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 242, 250 (D.R.I. 1999). 
 68.  Golden v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 06 Civ. 2970(RWS), 2007 WL 4299443 
at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2007); Moran v. GTL Constr., LLC, No. 06 Civ. 168(SCR), 
2007 WL 2142343 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2007); Khan v. IBI Armored Servs., Inc., 
474 F. Supp. 2d 448, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 504 F. 
Supp. 404, 406–07 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 675 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 69. Caminiti v. Cnty. of Essex, Civ. No. 04-4276 (WHW), 2007 WL 2226005 at 
*8 (D.N.J. July 31, 2007). 
 70. Cash v. Conn Appliances, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892 (E.D. Tex. 1997); 
Dahlheim v. KDFW-TV, 706 F. Supp. 493, 503–04 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 918 F.2d 
1220 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 71. Goldman v. RadioShack Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-0032, 2006 WL 336020 at *7 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2006);  Shaw v. Prentice Hall, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 909, 913 (S.D. 
Ind. 1997); Kowalski v. Kowalski Heat Treating Co., 920 F. Supp. 799, 806 (N.D. 
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have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard or stated that 
this was the rule that governed in their respective circuits. One state 
court that has squarely confronted the issue also concluded that the 
burden should be by a preponderance of the evidence.73 Consistent with 
the majority rule, Federal Civil Pattern Jury Instructions provide for a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.74 
In Renfro v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., the Sixth Circuit declined to 
apply a heightened standard of proof for the establishment of an 
exemption.75 The court observed that the Tenth Circuit had used the 
phrase “clear and affirmative” in regard to the employer’s burden in 
Donovan v. United Video, Inc.,76 without explanation, by citing to a prior 
United States Supreme Court opinion.77 However, the Sixth Circuit 
noted that the Supreme Court opinion cited in Donovan did “not raise 
the evidentiary burden; [but instead] it merely clarified that the 
applicability of an FLSA exemption is an affirmative defense.”78 The 
panel explained, “[w]e clarify here that the phrase ‘clear and affirmative 
evidence’ does not heighten [an employer’s] evidentiary burden when 
moving for summary judgment.”79 The court instructed: 
The word “clear,” as used in this phrase, traces to the 
“clearly erroneous” Rule 52(a) standard, but that 
standard is inapposite to our current review of a motion 
for summary judgment.  And because establishing the 
applicability of an FLSA exemption is an affirmative 
defense, [employers have] the burden to establish 
[exemptions] by a prepondrance of the evidence[.]80 
The case of Yi v. Sterling Collision Centers, Inc. provides another 
example of an application of the preponderance standard.81 There, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected arguments that a heightened burden of proof 
should be used to evaluate wage and hour exemptions.82 The court 
 
Ohio 1996); Fight v. Armour & Co., 533 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (W.D. Ark. 1982). 
 72. Rossi v. Associated Limousine Servs., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1359 
(S.D. Fla. 2006). 
 73. See Mitchell v. Pemco Mut. Ins. Co., 142 P.3d 623, 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2006). 
 74. See 3C Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E. Grenig & William C. Lee, Federal Jury 
Practice and Instructions §§ 175.40, 175.50, 175.71 (5th ed. 2000). 
 75. Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 76. 725 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 77. Renfro, 497 F.3d at 576; see also Donovan, 725 F.2d at 581. 
 78. Renfro, 497 F.3d at 576. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Yi v. Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 505 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 82. Id. at 507–08. 
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observed that considerable confusion had arisen from the use of phrases 
such as “clearly” and “affirmatively” or “plainly” and 
“unmistakablely.”83 Properly construed, these phrases did not affect the 
burden of proof but instead appeared to be “merely a clumsy invocation 
of the familiar principle of statutory interpretation that exemptions . . . 
should be construed narrowly.”84 This principle, however, could not and 
did not displace “the presumption that the burden of proof in federal 
civil cases is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”85   
The overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the 
burden of proof for establishing wage and hour exemptions have 
applied similar reasoning and have reached the same conclusion that 
was reached by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.86 Courts applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard have expressly or impliedly 
relied on a range of settled presumptions. First, in the absence of an 
express burden of proof, the burden that applies in civil cases is the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.87 Alaska applies the same 
principle.88 Second, legislative silence regarding the burden of proof will 
result in the preponderance of the evidence standard being applied.89 
Finally, exemptions are in the nature of affirmative defenses, and 
affirmative defenses are ordinarily established by a preponderance of 
the evidence.90 
However, there is some contrary authority. The Fourth Circuit 
applies a clear and convincing evidence standard as its burden of 
proof.91 This standard was imposed in Shockley v. City of Newport News.92 
The Shockley court never explained its reasoning or its analysis. Two 
other courts have cited and relied on Shockley without comment or 
 
 83. Id. at 507. 
 84. Id. at 508. 
 85. Id. at 507. 
 86. See cases cited supra notes 63–64. 
 87. See States Marine Corp. of Del. v. Producers Coop. Packing Co., 310 F.2d 
206, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Yi, 480 F.3d at 507–08. 
 88. See DeNuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272, 277–78 (Alaska 2003); 
Fernandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1, 5 n.13 (Alaska 2002) (citing Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). 
 89. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); United States v. 
Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 90. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc) (in context of Title VII), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 91. See Shockley v. City of Newport News, 997 F.2d 18, 21 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 92. Id.; see also Clark v. J.M. Benson Co., 789 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(citing Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 725 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1984)). But 
note that Clark and Donovan both spoke in terms of “clear and affirmative 
evidence.” Clark, 789 F.2d at 286; Donovan, 725 F.2d at 581 (emphasis added). 
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analysis.93 In addition, an unpublished 1991 decision from the District of 
Oregon also applied a clear and convincing standard.94 However, the 
court failed to consider existing Ninth Circuit precedent that applies a 
preponderance of the evidence standard95 and instead misunderstood a 
reference to “clear and affirmative” evidence in Donovan as establishing 
a higher burden of proof.96 Donovan did not apply a clear and 
convincing burden of proof standard, and other courts studying 
Donovan have noted that its reference to “clear and affirmative” 
evidence did not establish a heightened burden of proof.97 Indeed, the 
“clear and affirmative” language in Donovan came from a 1962 decision 
by the Tenth Circuit, which stated that “[o]ne asserting that an employee 
is exempt from the wage and hour provisions of the Act has the burden 
of establishing the exemption affirmatively and clearly.”98 And this 
language itself came from McComb v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co.: 
“And one asserting that its employees are exempt from the wage and 
hour provisions of the Act has the burden of showing affirmatively that 
they come clearly within an exemption provision.” 99 Such language 
suggests that the “clear and affirmative” requirement does not raise the 
standard of proof so much as describe how that standard must be met. 
And indeed, the Tenth Circuit itself has confirmed that the “clear and 
affirmative” standard is “merely a different articulation of . . . the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.”100 
C. Fred Meyer v. Bailey 
However, when the Alaska Supreme Court was faced in Fred Meyer 
of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey with the question of which burden of proof to 
apply when considering wage and hour exemptions, the court reached a 
 
 93. See Astor v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 303, 308 (Fed. Ct. Cl. 2007); Wright 
v. Monroe Cnty., No. 05-CV-6268T, 2007 WL 1434793, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 14, 
2007). 
 94. See Hall v. Porter Yett Co., Inc., CIV. No. 90-424-FR, 1991 WL 66830, at *3  
(D. Or. Apr. 19, 1991). 
 95. See Dickenson v. United States, 353 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1966); Coast 
Van Lines v. Armstrong, 167 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1948). 
 96. Hall, 1991 WL 66830, at *3. 
 97. See Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2007); Yi v. 
Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 506–08 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 98. See Legg v. Rock Prods. Mfg. Corp., 309 F.2d 172, 174 (10th Cir. 1962) 
(emphasis added). 
 99. McComb v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 167 F.2d 911, 915 (10th 
Cir. 1948), modified on other grounds, 337 U.S. 755 (1949) (emphasis added). 
 100. Neville v. U.S. Fid. & Gaur. Co., No. 95-6128, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8739, 
at *7–8 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (quoting Reich v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 853 F. 
Supp. 1325, 1329 n.2 (D. Kan. 1994). 
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very different conclusion than did the courts in any of the previously 
discussed cases. Ron Bailey was a manager working for the chain 
retailer Fred Meyer, which classified him as an exempt executive 
employee.101 Other employees filed a class action challenging Fred 
Meyer’s wage and hour practices.102 Bailey opted out of the class after he 
was threatened by his store manager, who purportedly advised all 
managers that they would not be promoted if they joined the class 
action.103 Later, however, another store manager clarified that Bailey 
would not lose his job if he filed a claim for overtime compensation, and 
Bailey filed suit.104 
The exemption at issue in Bailey’s case was the old form of the 
executive employee exemption under Alaska law.105 Eligibility for this 
exemption required six elements: (1) the employee’s primary duty was 
management; (2) the employee customarily and regularly directed the 
work of two or more employees; (3) the employee had the authority to 
hire or fire or could make recommendations that were accorded weight; 
(4) the employee customarily and regularly exercised discretionary 
authority; (5) the employee did not work more than a set prescribed 
percentage of time in non-exempt duties (forty percent for employees 
such as Bailey who worked in a retail business); and (6) the employee 
was paid on a salary basis.106 
Bailey’s case turned on whether or not more than forty percent of 
his time at work was spent performing non-exempt activities. The 
superior court conducted a bench trial and held that Bailey was non-
exempt.107 The court based this result on two findings in particular: that 
Bailey’s work included sales, restocking, and customer service tasks that 
were not directly or closely related to management and that he spent up 
to sixty percent of his time on these non-exempt tasks.108 It necessarily 
followed that he was non-exempt regardless of his managerial title. The 
superior court also concluded that Fred Meyer was not able to rely upon 
the good faith defense to limit liquidated damages and fees and 
awarded Bailey $254,056.34 in damages109 and $70,087.50 in attorney’s 
fees.110 
 
 101. See Fred Meyer v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881, 882–83 (Alaska 2004). 
 102. Id. at 883. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 884 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 15.910(a)(7) (2006)). 
 106. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 15.910(a)(7). 
 107. See Fred Meyer, 100 P.3d at 883. 
 108. Id. at 885. 
 109. Id. at 883.  Half of this damage award was liquidated damages.  Id. 
 110. Id. 
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Fred Meyer appealed, arguing primarily that Bailey was, in fact, 
exempt.111 The Alaska Supreme Court rejected Fred Meyer’s arguments 
and affirmed. Of relevance here, the court instructed that exemptions 
are narrowly construed and that “[t]he burden is on the employer to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the employee is exempt.”112 The 
court provided no analysis or discussion regarding this point.  Instead, it 
simply cited Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc.113 in a footnote and 
observed that “[c]ontrary to the explicit language in Dayhoff, Fred Meyer 
argues that the AWHA requires proof only by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”114 
The burden of proof argument was not addressed in Fred Meyer’s 
opening brief.115 It was not a principal issue on appeal. Bailey included 
one sentence in his answering brief in which he simply cited Dayhoff and 
stated that “Fred Meyer . . . bears the burden of proving Bailey’s 
overtime exemption beyond a reasonable doubt.”116 In response, Fred 
Meyer made brief reference to the burden of proof in its reply brief, 
which cited one case and a commercial jury instruction guide on the 
point, but did not otherwise analyze or explain its argument.117 Oral 
argument was never held. Instead, the appeal was submitted on the 
briefs.118 
The court’s citation to Dayhoff shed no light because the Dayhoff 
court never analyzed the issue either. Instead, in Dayhoff, the court noted 
that “AWHA is based upon the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and 
federal interpretations of FLSA are relevant in interpreting AWHA.”119 
The court further stated that “[u]nder federal law, the employer has the 
burden to prove the exemption is applicable.”120 The court then 
emphasized that exemptions are narrowly construed, and to drive the 
point home it quoted a United States Claims Court opinion for the 
proposition that “[i]f there is a reasonable doubt as to whether an 
 
 111. Id. at 884. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 848 P.2d 1367, 1371–72 (Alaska 1993). 
 114. Fred Meyer, 100 P.3d at 884 n.11. 
 115. See Brief of Appellant, Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881 
(Alaska 2004) (No. S-10968), 2003 WL 24048627. 
 116. See Brief for Appellee at 8, Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 
881 (Alaska 2004) (No. S-10958), 2003 WL 24048628. 
 117. See Reply Brief of Appellant, at 4, Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 
100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004) (No. S-10958). 
 118. The Alaska Supreme Court’s case management system reflects that the 
case was submitted on the briefs on February 19, 2004. See http:// 
www.appellate.courts.state.ak.us/frames1.asp?Bookmark=S10968 (click “Oral 
Argument”) (last visited Mar. 2, 2011). 
 119. Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., 848 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Alaska 1993). 
 120. Id. at 1371–72. 
FISHER_FINAL 5/5/2011  3:20:29 PM 
2011 WAGE & HOUR EXEMPTION STANDARD 111 
employee meets the criteria for exemption, the employee should be 
ruled non-exempt.”121 
The Claims Court decision in question was Adam v. United States.122 
However, the Adam case never analyzed the issue either. Instead, the 
court was addressing a threshold issue concerning whether or not 
jurisdiction existed; specifically, the court examined whether or not 
sovereign immunity had been waived under the circumstances of the 
case.123 In the course of resolving this issue, the court quoted a policy 
from the Civil Service Commission (an agency that has been replaced by 
the Office of Personnel Management) in which the Commission’s policy  
declared: “if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether an employee 
meets the criteria for exemption, the employee should be ruled 
nonexempt.”124 The issue itself, however, was not being argued in the 
case and was not actually addressed or analyzed by the court. 
D. 2005 Amendments to the Alaska Wage and Hour Act 
Before turning to an analysis of the Fred Meyer standard, there is 
one additional legal development that needs to be addressed. In 2004 the 
United States Department of Labor promulgated new regulations 
covering exemptions under the FLSA.125 The purpose was to clarify and 
streamline certain exemptions, especially the “white collar” exemptions, 
so that the legal standards would be easier to interpret and apply. The 
Alaska Legislature followed suit and amended the AWHA in 2005. 
House Bill 182 (HB 182) took effect on November 7, 2005, almost one 
year to the day after the Alaska Supreme Court issued its opinion in Fred 
Meyer v. Bailey.126 
Under HB 182, the Alaska Legislature adopted the new federal 
regulations used for the section 13 “white collar” exemptions 
(professional, executive, administrative, and computer professionals) 
and made other revisions to bring Alaska law into conformity with the 
FLSA.127 The purpose for the amendments was to bring Alaska law into 
 
 121. Id. at 1372 (quoting Adam v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 782, 786 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 122. 26 Cl. Ct. 782 (1992). 
 123. Id. at 785–86. 
 124. Id. at 786. 
 125. For a discussion see Labor Department Overhauled Overtime Regulations, 
JABURG WILK,  http://www.jaburgwilk.com/articles/overtime-regulations.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2011). 
 126.  100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004). 
 127. See 2005 Alaska Sess. Laws *1–2; ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 
2198–99 (2005). 
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closer alignment with federal exemption standards.128 HB 182’s sponsor 
noted, “[t]he goal of the bill . . . is to bring Alaska code into greater 
conformance with the federal law so that employers wouldn’t have such 
difficulty when looking at two sets of laws.”129 The Alaska Legislature 
did not want different standards governing the same legal rights and 
obligations. 
As amended by HB 182, the AWHA specifically provides that the 
“white collar” exemptions should be interpreted in accordance with the 
FLSA.130 Instead of adopting the federal regulations and allowing Alaska 
courts and the Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce 
Development to interpret those definitions under the AWHA, the 
legislature emphasized that the exemptions have “the meaning and shall 
be interpreted in accordance with [federal law].”131 Moreover, the 
Alaska Legislature did not anchor its amendment in time. Instead, as the 
FLSA or its regulations are amended or revised in the future, the AWHA 
will automatically track those amendments. As amended, the AWHA 
also retained regulations and interpretative guidance instructing that the 
FLSA’s regulations and interpretations should govern analysis of the 
AWHA’s exemptions.132 
II. THE FRED MEYER STANDARD SHOULD BE ABANDONED 
Traced back to its origins, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
expressed as dicta in Dayhoff, and then applied as a holding in Fred 
Meyer, finds no logical or legal support.  It is based on an attempt by an 
official of a now-defunct federal agency to articulate the concept that 
exemptions should be narrowly construed.133 No other court or 
jurisdiction is known to apply a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for 
determining whether or not wage and hour exemptions have been 
established. It does not comport with precedent, reason, or policy and 
should be abandoned. 
 
 128. See Alaska H. Labor & Commerce Comm. Minutes, 24th Leg., at 18 
(2005). 
 129. See id. at 8–10, 15–16; ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg., at 4–5 
(2005). 
 130. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1)–(2) (2010). 
 131. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1). 
 132. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1)–(2). 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 124. 
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A. Fred Meyer Stands Against Overwhelming Precedent 
The Fred Meyer standard is at odds with the overwhelming majority 
of state and federal courts that have addressed the issue.134 Indeed, no 
other court is known to have actually adopted and applied a beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard in a case. Even those few courts that have 
adopted a heightened burden of proof have stopped at the clear and 
convincing evidence standard.135 No court is known to have ventured 
further than that except for the Alaska Supreme Court. 
Numbers alone should never dictate a result. Just because the 
overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that wage and hour 
exemptions should be analyzed under a preponderance of the evidence 
standard is not, on its own, a sufficient basis for abandoning Fred Meyer. 
Indeed, there are circumstances where the Alaska Supreme Court has 
staked out positions dramatically at odds with most other courts and 
has done so for principled reasons that best comport with how Alaskans 
view life, law, and their relationship to society.136 However, where the 
clear weight of reasoned authority points in one direction, the court 
should at least acknowledge this fact and explain any contrary position. 
This is particularly true where, as here, the competing legal principles 
are supposed to be interpreted and applied in a consistent manner. 
In this respect, the AWHA is patterned after the FLSA.137 Alaska 
courts will look to the FLSA and federal case law interpreting and 
applying the FLSA for guidance.138 As noted, for FLSA claims, the 
overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed this issue have 
concluded that the burden of proof for establishing wage and hour 
exemptions should be by a preponderance of the evidence.139 Indeed, 
this principle has taken firm root in civil pattern jury instruction 
 
 134. See supra notes 63–74 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 136. For example, in Ravin v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized a 
right to possession of a limited amount of marijuana for personal use in one’s 
house based on Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 
1975). The court based its reasoning on the unique nature of privacy 
considerations in Alaska. Id. at 503–04. In Anchorage Police Dep’t Emp.’s Ass’n v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, the court struck down a random drug testing policy 
for public safety personnel on privacy grounds, notwithstanding the fact that the 
vast majority of federal and state courts analyzing similar policies have upheld 
such testing. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001). These are merely two examples for 
illustrative purposes.  In each case, the court took pains to articulate its 
reasoning. 
 137. See Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., 848 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Alaska 
1993). 
 138. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.145. 
 139. See supra notes 63–74 and accompanying text. 
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guides.140 Given that the AWHA is largely based on the FLSA and that 
Alaska courts look to the FLSA and its case law for interpretative 
guidance, it only makes sense for the AWHA to apply the same burden 
of proof that has been adopted and applied by the overwhelming 
majority of courts. 
In this sense precedent is not simply a numbers game. Instead, it 
truly reflects the better weight of reasoned authority, and that authority 
is based on an analysis of legal principles that are substantially similar if 
not identical to principles recognized in Alaska. Consequently, 
evaluated against existing precedent, Fred Meyer falls short. 
B. The Fred Meyer Standard Is Not Supported by Principled Reason 
The Fred Meyer standard conflicts with the underlying spirit of the 
2005 amendments to the AWHA. The Alaska Legislature adopted 
federal standards for several of the same exemptions that are most 
frequently litigated.141 The legislature did not want employers to face the 
same litigation with different standards governing the outcome.142 Yet 
that is precisely what would happen presently. If an employer was 
attempting to establish an administrative employee exemption for 
claims filed under the FLSA and the AWHA, the burden of proof under 
the FLSA claim would be by a preponderance of the evidence while the 
burden of proof under the AWHA claim would be beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This is not an academic concern; the same exemption defined and 
governed by the same regulatory standards would be analyzed under 
differing burdens of proof that could easily lead to conflicting results. 
The same law and the same facts should be governed by the same 
burden of proof—especially when state law commands that Alaska 
courts should look to and apply federal law. 
The Fred Meyer standard also undermines settled principles that 
generally apply to all cases. Civil cases are governed by a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.143 That is the default standard 
that applies in Alaska as well.144 As a general matter, the Alaska 
Legislature is presumed to be familiar with such principles.145 And 
 
 140. See 3C O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 74, at §§ 175.40, 175.50, 175.71. 
 141. See ALASKA H. JOURNAL, supra note 127. 
 142. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 143. See States Marine Corp. of Del. v. Producers Coop. Packing Co., 310 F.2d 
206, 212 (9th Cir. 1962). 
 144. See DeNuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272, 277–78 (Alaska 2003); 
Fernandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1, 5 n.13 (Alaska 2002) (citing Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). 
 145. See, e.g., Purdy v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 762, 764 (D. Alaska 1956) 
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indeed, the legislature established a “clear and convincing” burden of 
proof for establishing a good faith defense.146 Thus, its silence in 
addressing any burden of proof for exemptions should be interpreted as 
accepting the preponderance of the evidence standard.147 
The process by which Fred Meyer reached its result is also 
problematic. The burden of proof was not actually at issue in the case. 
The subject was never identified as an issue on appeal and was never 
addressed in the opening brief.148 It was only cursorily referenced in the 
opposition brief in a boilerplate paragraph.149 The employer then made 
brief reference to the burden of proof in its reply brief but did not 
analyze or explain its argument.150 Oral argument was never held. 
Instead, the appeal was submitted on the briefs.151 The Alaska Supreme 
Court ordinarily never considers arguments that are raised for the first 
time in a reply brief.152 It is not clear why the court elected to do so here 
and why it adopted such a sweeping rule that runs counter to all 
existing precedent without the benefit of oral argument and a more 
developed briefing record. With due respect for the court, the issue 
deserves more than a dismissive footnote. 
The Fred Meyer standard also suffers in that it is seemingly 
inconsistent with the AWHA’s statutory scheme. As previously noted, 
under the AWHA an employer must establish its good faith by clear and 
convincing evidence in order to avoid imposition of liquidated 
damages.153 It makes little sense to apply a higher burden of proof to 
establish an exemption and then a lower burden of proof to avoid 
penalties for a wage and hour violation. This renders the good faith 
exception somewhat academic since if an employer can establish an 
exemption under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, it would 
never have a reason to prove good faith. What would make sense, 
however, is to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to 
determine whether or not an exemption exists.  If the employer cannot 
establish the existence of an exemption under this basic standard then it 
 
(“The Legislature is presumed to know the existing law.”). 
 146. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(d)–(e) (2010). 
 147. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 115. 
 149. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 116, at *8 (“Fred Meyer, which bears the 
burden of proving Bailey’s overtime exemption beyond a reasonable doubt must 
prove that Bailey met each of six tests found at [title eight, section 15.910(a)(7) of 
the Alaska Administrative Code] to qualify Bailey as an ‘executive.’” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
 150. See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 117, at 3. 
 151. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Willoya v. State, 53 P.3d 1115, 1125–26 (Alaska 2002). 
 153. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(d)–(e) (2010). 
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makes sense to require a greater showing in order for the employer to 
avoid imposition of penalties. 
C. Policy Does Not Commend the Fred Meyer Standard 
The AWHA protects remedial rights and interests, and an 
argument can be made that applying a heightened burden of proof for 
exemptions is in keeping with this protective function. Yet the 
preponderance of the evidence standard is commonly applied in 
situations where significant rights and interests are implicated. For 
instance, perhaps the most important federal remedial statutory right is 
Title VII, which is designed to eradicate unlawful employment 
discrimination.154 In Title VII cases, employers may rebut an employee’s 
prima facie case during application of the McDonnell Douglas burden 
shifting test on less than a preponderance of the evidence.155 Similarly, 
Title VII affirmative defenses are established by a preponderance of the 
evidence.156 The Alaska Supreme Court has held that preponderance of 
the evidence is the appropriate standard to use for evaluating just cause 
to terminate public employees—a situation where individuals are 
threatened with loss of their livelihood.157 The United States Supreme 
Court has held that creditors need only prove entitlement to an 
exception to a debtor’s right to discharge by a preponderance of the 
evidence.158 One would think that these cases implicate rights and 
interests of greater significance than an individual’s right to overtime, 
yet a lesser burden of proof has been deemed adequate in all of these 
other contexts. Even if one placed an individual’s right to overtime on 
equal footing with these other remedial rights, there would not seem to 
be any reason to adopt a different (and heightened) burden of proof. 
Moreover, there is no support for the conclusion that applying a 
preponderance of the evidence standard will erode employees’ rights 
and interests protected by wage and hour law. The states and federal 
circuits applying the preponderance of the evidence standard have not 
evidenced an erosion of rights. Indeed, as noted, the Sixth Circuit 
applies a preponderance of the evidence standard to analyze 
 
 154. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
 155. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259–60 (1981); 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801–05 (1973). 
 156. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) 
(explaining that in the context of a hostile work environment claim under Title 
VII, “a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or 
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence”). 
 157. See Jurgens v. City of North Pole, 153 P.3d 321, 331 (Alaska 2007). 
 158. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991). 
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exemptions,159 yet employees’ claims for overtime have prevailed 
nonetheless.160 
In addition, there would not seem to be any reason to adopt a 
heightened burden of proof to protect overtime since overtime is now 
being applied in a manner that actually undermines its initial declared 
purposes. As previously discussed, the central purposes underlying 
overtime were to create jobs and to protect workers from onerous 
working conditions.161 At present, however, employers are finding it 
more economical to compel workers to work overtime rather than hiring 
new employees because it is less expensive to pay employees overtime 
than to hire new workers for whom additional fringe benefits costs 
would have to be incurred.162 
From a policy perspective, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
carries risks of unintended consequences—particularly with respect to 
its impact on the workplace. Unlike government agencies, private 
employers do not have unlimited resources to investigate and prosecute 
cases. By virtue of its size and its industries, Alaska has many remote 
sites or on-call employees.163 It is reasonable to posit that employers, 
knowing that they would need to establish any exemption beyond a 
reasonable doubt, would be more likely to adopt burdensome or 
intrusive monitoring and recordkeeping policies. 
The Fred Meyer standard places an undue burden on Alaska 
businesses. Small businesses with a flexible workforce are common in 
Alaska.164 In order to be productive, competitive, and cost-efficient, 
 
 159. See Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 160. See Martin v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 161. See SCHOR, supra note 18. 
 162. See Sherry Slater, Overtime Trumps Hiring, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 
15, 2010, available at http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20100815/BIZ/308159953; Megan Woolhouse, For Small Businesses, 
a Hesitancy To Hire, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2011, available at http:// 
www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/02/14/for_small_
businesses__a_hesitancy_to_hire;. 
 163. Many of Alaska’s wage and hour cases involve employees working at 
remote locations or working in on-call situations. See, e.g., Geneva Woods v. 
Thygeson, 181 P.3d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 2008) (home visit nurse); Air Logistics of 
Alaska, Inc. v. Throop, 181 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Alaska 2008) (helicopter mechanics 
working at remote site). 
 164. Summaries published by the Small Business Administration reflect that 
small businesses dominate the Alaskan economic landscape in terms of number 
of employers if not revenue.  See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS PROFILE 
(2009), available at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/profiles/09ak.pdf. 
The Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s most recent 
survey of private employers in Alaska was published in July 2010.  See ALASKA 
DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., ALASKA ECONOMIC TRENDS (2010), available at 
http://labor.state.ak.us/trends/jul10.pdf. 
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employers may need their employees to wear more than one hat. For 
example, a manager may have as his or her primary duty management 
of the enterprise but may also be expected to tackle non-managerial 
duties from time to time as the need arises. Employers shouldering a 
beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof to establish an exemption 
will face problems efficiently allocating tasks and resources. 
Finally, Fred Meyer has the perverse effect of undermining workers’ 
rights and interests. It encourages employers and businesses to 
outsource labor or to use independent contractors instead of employees, 
particularly in the more skilled trades or professions. For example, most 
businesses need computer professionals to develop and maintain 
necessary hardware, software, and servers. Computer professionals 
often work long, irregular hours because no one can predict when 
viruses will hit or when equipment will fail. Businesses obviously prefer 
to classify these employees as exempt and to pay them on a salary basis. 
However, if there is doubt concerning whether or not the employees 
should be classified as exempt or nonexempt, prudent businesses will 
simply outsource the labor for risk management purposes to minimize 
exposure to overtime liability. The Fred Meyer standard is custom-built 
to engender such doubt. The impact on workers is obvious to anyone 
who has actually owned or managed a business or advised business 
clients. Most employers offer their employees some level of fringe 
benefits (health insurance, retirement or 401K plans, vacation or sick 
leave or paid time off) that are not available to independent contractors. 
Consequently, the Fred Meyer standard encourages businesses to 
outsource labor in skilled trades or professions, which in turn erodes 
those workers’ rights and interests. The result is fundamentally at odds 
with the declared goals of the FLSA and the AWHA—to improve the 
quality of life and living standards for American workers.165 
D. Fred Meyer Can and Should Be Abandoned 
Viewed from any angle, the Fred Meyer standard falls short when 
analyzed against social, legal, political, or economical concerns. It stands 
alone against the greater weight of reasoned authority. Not only does it 
stand alone, but it stands mute. We are supplied with no apparent 
justification for such a stark rule. The standard frustrates underlying 
policy goals and finds no support in precedent or reason. Fred Meyer can 
and should be abandoned. 
 
 165. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.050 (2010). 
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III. AVAILABLE OPTIONS TO ADDRESS  AND CORRECT  FRED 
MEYER 
If this Article’s analysis is correct, then the Fred Meyer standard 
should be discarded in favor of a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. However, even if one disagreed with this Article’s analysis, 
the subject deserves more study than a cursory footnote. The following 
paragraphs address judicial and legislative options for studying and 
remedying Fred Meyer. A court challenge would be slower and 
somewhat less predictable but would hopefully provide for a full, 
measured consideration of the underlying principles. In contrast, 
legislative options most likely would be more time and cost efficient but 
perhaps offer less deliberative insight. 
A. Judicial 
An employer seeking to challenge the Fred Meyer standard could 
attempt to litigate the issue through the courts. The Alaska Supreme 
Court accords due regard for precedent in light of principles governing 
stare decisis and will not readily overrule precedent.166 The basic test for 
overruling an opinion is that the court will do so “only if . . . clearly 
convinced that the precedent is erroneous or no longer sound because of 
changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from 
overturning the case.”167 It is probable that the court would not even 
consider the issue unless it was dispositive with respect to the case on 
appeal. This means that there would probably have to be an extremely 
close case with perhaps a ruling from a superior court judge that the 
result was affected by the burden of proof. 
Although the Alaska Supreme Court has seldom overruled 
precedent, it has happened on a few occasions. One recent case arose in 
Kinegak v. State, Department of Corrections, in which the court examined 
whether or not a person who was imprisoned longer than he should 
have been due to an inadvertent clerical error should be able to allege a 
civil claim for negligent supervision or negligent recordkeeping.168 
Kinegak was convicted of misdemeanor charges and served seven extra 
days when a clerical error caused a miscalculation of the time he was 
supposed to serve.169 He filed suit and alleged negligence.170 The State 
 
 166. See Kinegak v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 129 P.3d 887, 889–90 (Alaska 2006). 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. at 888–89. 
 169. Id. at 888. 
 170. Id. 
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moved to dismiss noting that under Alaska’s sovereign immunity 
statute—section 09.50.250(3) of the Alaska Statutes—sovereign 
immunity was not waived for false imprisonment claims.171 Kinegak 
argued that properly construed, his claim was more in the nature of a 
negligent supervision or negligent recordkeeping claim and accordingly 
should be viable under Zerbe v. State.172 In Zerbe, the court allowed a 
claim after a bench warrant was issued by mistake.173 The Zerbe court 
relied on federal authorities that interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) as allowing claims for negligent recordkeeping to proceed.174 
Federal authorities provided persuasive guidance because Alaska’s 
statute was patterned after the FTCA. 
The State conceded that if Zerbe was still good law, Kinegak’s 
complaint should be reinstated.175 However, the State argued that Zerbe 
had either been overruled by subsequent Alaska precedent or that more 
recent federal case law interpreting and applying the FTCA cast doubt 
on the case law and premises upon which the Zerbe court relied.176 
In a sharply divided 3-2 opinion, the court agreed with the State 
that subsequent federal case law had significantly changed the analytical 
foundation underlying Zerbe.177 In particular, it was now clear that a 
claim could not arise from negligent supervision, training, or hiring of 
government employees.178 The factual circumstances of Kinegaks’s 
negligent recordkeeping claim were dependent on a false imprisonment 
theory.179 This being so, the majority concluded that Kinegak’s claim 
was barred by Alaska’s sovereign immunity statute, which preserved 
sovereign immunity for such claims.180 
If the right AWHA case came along, Kinegak provides an analytical 
foundation for overruling Fred Meyer. Traced back to its source, the Fred 
Meyer court relied on uncertain federal precedent that has been rejected 
by the overwhelming majority of federal courts. The decision was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound. Moreover, persisting in 
applying Fred Meyer would do more harm than good because it would 
create the risk of logically inconsistent decisions being reached. 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 889. 
 173. Zerbe v. State, 578 P.2d 597, 601 (Alaska 1978). 
 174. Id. at 600–01. 
 175. Kinegak, 129 P.3d at 889. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 890–92. 
 178. Id. at 892. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 893. 
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However, under any circumstances, it is difficult to persuade the 
Alaska Supreme Court (or any court) to overrule existing precedent. For 
example, in Kinegak, the State based part of its argument on the fact that 
two prior Alaska Supreme Court decisions had held that Zerbe was 
overruled to the extent that it conflicted with their results.181 The 
majority, however, was unwilling to adopt this argument because the 
cases in question addressed a separate issue concerning whether or not 
the State had a duty to exercise due care when initiating civil or criminal 
proceedings.182 Moreover, notwithstanding the sound basis for 
concluding that subsequent federal case law had materially changed the 
analytical foundation underlying Zerbe, the majority garnered only three 
of five votes. 
Another approach that an employer seeking to challenge the Fred 
Meyer standard in court could take is to argue that HB 182 superseded 
Fred Meyer. The Alaska Supreme Court has accepted the premise that 
legislative action may abrogate or supersede a prior holding.183 In 
Sowinski v. Walker, the court held that the Alaska Legislature’s enactment 
of pure several liability superseded prior precedent and affected 
application of Alaska’s dram shop statute.184 The court explained that “a 
prior decision may be abandoned because of ‘changed conditions’ if 
‘related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old 
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [or] facts have so 
changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule 
of significant application.’”185 
HB 182 fits this standard. The Alaska Legislature specifically 
adopted federal “white collar” exemptions.186 The Alaska Legislature 
also retained specific guidance directing courts to interpret and apply 
the AWHA by reference to federal law.187 The Alaska Legislature made 
it clear that it intended to amend the AWHA to bring Alaska law into 
closer alignment with federal law and standards.188 The Alaska 
Legislature went further than simply adopting federal regulations. The 
Alaska Legislature could have adopted the federal definitions and left it 
to Alaska courts and the Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce 
 
 181. Id. at 889. 
 182. Id. at 889 n.12. 
 183. See Sowinski v. Walker, 198 P.3d 1134, 1148 n.45 (Alaska 2008); Pratt & 
Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska 1993). 
 184. Sowinski, 198 P.3d at 1148–49. 
 185. Id. at 1149 n.45 (quoting Pratt & Whitney Canada, 852 P.2d at 1176). 
 186. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1)–(2) (2010). 
 187. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.145 (2010). 
 188. See ALASKA H. LABOR & COMMERCE COMM. MINUTES, supra note 128, at 8–
10, 15–16, 18; ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, supra note 129, at 4–5. 
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Development to interpret those definitions under the AWHA. Instead of 
taking this approach, the Alaska Legislature emphasized that the 
exemptions have “the meaning and shall be interpreted in accordance 
with [federal law].”189 Moreover, the Alaska Legislature did not anchor 
its amendment in time. Instead, as the FLSA or its regulations are 
amended or revised in the future, the AWHA will automatically track 
those amendments. 
These considerations support the argument that HB 182 is a 
changed condition that essentially abrogates or supersedes the Fred 
Meyer standard. The Alaska Legislature intended that the same law 
should be governed by the same standards. Allowing a different burden 
of proof to govern the same facts and same standards is inconsistent 
with HB 182. Accordingly, short of asking the court to overrule Fred 
Meyer, an employer could argue that HB 182 legislatively accomplished 
that task already. 
B. Legislative 
From the perspective of stability, predictability, and confidence in 
the judiciary, precedent should seldom be overruled. Although Fred 
Meyer represents a poor rule, it would be difficult to secure its 
abrogation or to have the case overruled by the Alaska Supreme Court. 
The right case would have to come along at the right moment. 
A more time and cost efficient solution would be for the Alaska 
Legislature to simply amend the AWHA. This could be completed in 
one session. Section 23.10.060 of the Alaska Statutes could be amended 
to add one subdivision: “(k) In an action to recover unpaid overtime 
compensation or unpaid minimum wages, the defendant shall have the 
burden of proof to establish the existence of any claimed exemptions by 
a preponderance of the evidence.” 
The only problem with the legislative option relates to the practical 
dynamics of the process. The Alaska Legislature convenes for ninety day 
sessions. This does not necessarily allow for measured deliberation. A 
concerted lobbying effort would probably be necessary to identify and 
explain the issue in advance and to build the required support to secure 
passage within the legislature’s short session. However, legislators 
would presumably recognize the value in an amendment that is not only 
business-friendly but that also protects workers’ rights and carries the 
added advantage of bringing clarity and uniformity to the law. 
 
 189. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1) (2010). 
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CONCLUSION 
A sound rule of law should be based on reason, policy, and 
precedent. The Fred Meyer standard is not—it finds no support in reason, 
policy, or precedent. Whether by judicial or legislative action, the Fred 
Meyer standard should be abandoned in favor of the majority rule that 
has stood the test of time. 
 
